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The Buddha’s Motivations for Teaching
and Their Historical Background
Junkichi imanishi
Traditionally, the Buddha’s teachings are considered to be unique, but his-
torically speaking many of his teachings were formulated as a response to 
or criticism of other philosophical and religious ideas of his time. Modern 
scholarship is aware of the problem, but it has rarely tackled it in detail. We 
know, for instance, that the Buddha’s theory of selflessness (anātman) was 
a reaction against the Upaniṣadic ātman philosophy, but there are no studies 
clarifying which particular ātman doctrine the Buddha had in mind. This 
paper attempts to address such shortcomings and shed more light on the 
background of the Buddha’s doctrines in relation to his antecedents. 
1. Uddālaka Āruṇi’s Philosophy
Uddālaka Āruṇi is ranked alongside Yājñavalkya as a representative phi-
losopher of the Upaniṣads. According to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Chapter 
VI), Uddālaka expounded a theory that had the concept of Being (sat) at its 
center. He denied the non-being (asat) theory, maintaining that in the begin-
ning there was only Being (VI, 2, 2). From Being, light (tejas) was born, 
and from light water (ap) came forth (VI, 2, 3). This, in its turn, produced 
food (anna) (VI, 2, 4). Next, Being (now referred to as devatā) thought to 
enter into these three principles (also called devatā) by means of the living 
self ( jīvenātmanā) and to develop (vyākaravaṇi) names (nāma) and forms 
(rūpa), i.e., the phenomenal world (VI, 3, 2). 
Fire (agni) is not included among the three primordial principles and is 
described as a transformation (vikāra). This “transformation,” Uddālaka says, 
“is [a modality of] grasping by means of words, a name (vācārambhaṇaṃ 
vikāro nāmadheyam)” (VI, 4, 1).1 Human beings are also born of these three 
1  On vācārambhaṇa, see Nakamura 1990: 256 and passim, p. 300f.; Nakamura 1951: 187f.; 
Gotō 1989.
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principles (VI, 5-8). And Being, which is the root of all, is now also called 
ātman (VI, 9, 4; 10, 3; 11, 3; 12, 3; 13, 3; 14, 3; 15, 3; 16, 3). By asserting 
that the transformations of the three principles are names, Uddālaka does 
not mean that they are unsubstantial, devoid of reality. The entire creation, 
including humans, evolves from Being according to a fixed order. And the 
words, which grasp phenomena, must also follow and submit to this order. 
2. Sañjaya’s Doctrine and Its Critique
Let us have a look now at the views of Sañjaya, one of the contemporary her-
etic teachers criticized by the Buddha. According to the Sāmaññaphalasutta, 
Sañjaya was asked by King Ajātasattu about the fruits of the recluse life 
(sāmaññaphala). His answer touches upon four points: the existence of ano-
ther world (i.e., rebirth); the existence of spontaneously arisen beings; the 
existence of karmic results; the existence of the Tathāgata after death. Here 
is how he details his stance regarding the first point: 
If you ask me: “Is there another world?,” if I thought another 
world exists, I would answer you it does. But I don’t think so, I 
don’t think it is as such, I don’t think it is different, I don’t think 
it is not so, I don’t think it is not the case that it is not so.2
Sañjaya goes on to say that he would answer the same if asked whether 
another world does not exist, whether another world both exists and does 
not exist, whether another world neither exists nor does not exist. And he 
replies similarly to the other three points. 
The Sāmaññaphalasutta (DN I 59) calls Sañjaya’s attitude vikkhepa. The 
Brahmajālasutta (DN I 24f.) likewise refers to such views as amarāvikkhepa 
and criticizes the ascetics and Brahmins who answer in such a manner 
(amarāvikkhepika) as committing the error of vācāvikkhepa or amarāvikkhepa. 
A similar criticism is also voiced at MN I 519. 
The sixty-two wrong views set forth in the Brahmajālasutta are also dis-
cussed in the *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 and the Yogācārabhūmi 
瑜伽師地論. In both treatises, the views corresponding to amarāvikkhepa are 
referred to in Chinese as four types of 不死矯亂, literally “immortal misrep-
2  Evantipi me no, tathatipi me no, aññathatipi me no, notipi me no, no notipi me no. (DN I 58). 
There are differences in the wording of this sentence in the Chinese parallel Shamenguo jing 
沙門果經: 大王. 現有沙門果報. 問如是. 答此事如是. 此事實. 此事異. 此事非異非不異. (T 1.01: 
108c20-22). In this respect, the Chinese version is similar in wording to the Brahmajālasutta 
(DN I 25f.). See, however, the Chinese version of the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra, Shelifu 
apitanlun 舍利弗阿毘曇論: 此事如是非也. 此事實非也. 此事異非也. 此事非異非不異非也. (T 
1548.28: 658b3-4, 12-14, 20-22, 25-26).
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resenting agitation.” The same line of construing the term is also found in 
the Theravāda exegetical tradition. The Pali commentaries take amarā in the 
sense of na marati (i.e., a-mara), “not die,” and gloss the word as follows: 
What does this [“not-dying”] refer to? By unfolding an argument 
based on “I don’t think so,” wrong views (diṭṭhi) and words (vācā) 
are endless ( pariyantarahita). (DN-a I 115; MN-a III 233) 
How is vikkhepa construed? 
Vikkhepa means “to be scattered in all directions.” Amarāvikkhepa 
is used in the sense of scattering “never-dying” [i.e., endlessly] 
wrong views and words (diṭṭhiya vācaya ca vikkhepo). And those 
[who take such views] are [called] amarāvikkhepika. (ibid.)
The term pariyantarahita clearly shows that later exegetes took amarā as 
the feminine form of the adjective amara, which is quite a forced interpre-
tation.3 But the commentators also put forth another interpretation:
Amarā is a species of fish. The fish swims up and down [so it 
is] impossible to catch. Similarly, this talk (vāda) goes here and 
there, impossible to grasp. It is, therefore, called amarāvikkha. 
And those who [engage in it] are [called] amarāvikkhepika. 
Here, too, the exegetes focus on “talk,” “discourse,” “argument” (vāda) rather 
than on “word,” “language” (vācā), although the Brahmajālasutta also uses 
the term vācāvikkhepa (see above). As a “discourse” is expressed verbally, 
it can be said to encompass both the content, i.e., views, and the linguistic 
medium, i.e., words. Nonetheless, one gets the impression that the exegetes 
were not particularly interested in elaborating upon the nature of vācā itself. 
Usually, when more than one gloss appears in a commentary, the authors 
show support for the last one they discuss. If such is the case here, then they 
seem to uphold the second interpretation. The species of fish referred to 
here is usually construed to be the eel. Nakamura explains the compound as 
“discourse which is difficult to catch like a slippery eel.”4
How is the *amarāvikṣepa 不死矯亂 compound construed in the 
*Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra? 
[Concerning] those [who propound] the theory of four [kinds 
of] “immortal misrepresenting agitation” (*amarāvikṣepa 不死矯
3  See Hata 2009. Cf. also amarā-vitakka, in Cone 2001: 227r, which has both amarāvitakka 
and amaravitakka.
4  Nakamura 1991: 137.
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亂), “immortal” [here] refers to a dweller of the heavenly worlds 
(*deva 天). Due to [the fact that such] dwellers are long-lived, the 
heretics become attached [to the idea of becoming a deva] and 
consider [the state] eternal, immortal.5
It is a different line of semantic interpretation, but again, as in the Pali tradi-
tion, the emphasis is on amarā° rather than on vācā°.6
In conclusion, we can say that the exegesis is more concerned with diṭṭhi 
and vāda, which is used instead of vācā. Of course, diṭṭhi and vāda are 
expressed by means of vācā, but the validity of diṭṭhi and vāda (hence of 
vācā but only as a medium of conveying them) is judged according to their 
content. Nonetheless, I believe that there is a special significance in the use of 
vācā in the compound above, and it certainly deserves more attention per se.
Uddālaka, as we have seen above, held that the entire world and its evo-
lution follow an order. Phenomena become named, and language makes it 
possible to grasp the world. I believe a compound like vācāvikkhepa can be 
regarded as an attempt to criticize the incoherent philosophical confusion at 
the level of language (vācā). 
3. The Problem of Language
Uddālaka linked language to existence. Even if we take the world of trans-
formation (vikāra) as a mere designation in relation to Being and three prin-
ciples, it is not non-existence. As far as its roots go back to Being and three 
principles, the phenomenal world has a relative existence. Uddālaka built 
up his theory in order to make such a point. 
5  四不死矯亂論者. 不死謂天. 以天長壽外道執為常住不死. (T 1545.27: 998a11-12)
6  We should add that in Buddhist literature vikkhepa/vikṣepa often collocates with citta or 
cetas, with the meaning of “(mental) distraction/agitation.” For example: 
cetaso vikkhepo, A.N. III, 448. A.N.V, 145(3), etc.
cetaso vikkhepaṃ pahatuṃ. So vikkhittacitto, A.N.V, 147 
Tattha katamo cetaso vikkhepo? Yaṃ cittassa uddhaccaṃ avupasamo cetaso vikkhepo
bhantattaṃ cittassa – ayaṃ vuccati ‘cetaso vikkhepo. Vibh. 373
The opposite of this is the state of those whose mind is not agitated (avikkhittacitta, A.N. 
III, 174) and the antidote to vikkhepa is mental one-pointedness (ekagga) achieved through 
meditative concentration (samādhi): 
Cittaṃ yassa vasibhutaṃ, ekaggaṃ susamahitaṃ. A.N. I, 164. 167
samahitaṃ cittaṃ ekaggaṃ, M. N. I, 21. 117. 186. 189. S.N. IV, 125
Asubhaya cittaṃ bhavehi, ekaggaṃ susamahitaṃ;
Vikkhittacittonekaggo, samma dhammaṃ na passati;
Apassamano saddhammaṃ, dukkha na parimuccati.  V. P. II, 235
Avikkhittacitto ekaggo, sammā dhammaṃ vipassati;
Sampassamāno saddhammaṃ, dukkha so parimuccati. V.P. II, 235
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The Buddha, however, did not admit the real existence of language. The 
basic problem underlying Sañjaya’s position is connected to the doctrines 
of eternalism (sassatavāda) and annihilationism (ucchedavāda). The admit-
tance of the language of existence would have amounted to the acceptance 
of eternalism, a wrong view consistently rejected by Buddhism. In the words 
of the Brahmajālasutta, “annihilationism postulates the annihilation, destruc-
tion, and non-existence of existing beings,”7 while eternalism “postulates the 
eternity of the self and the world.”8
The Buddha did not accept the real existence of language. He always set 
a great deal of importance on experience and used words from the range of 
experience. When he talked about daily matters, he employed such words 
as diṭṭhadhamma and paccuppanna, avoiding expressions that could be con-
strued as presupposing real existence or having roots in real existence.9
4. The Meaning of sakkāya/satkāya 
The compound sakkāya is closely related to the problem of existence. There 
is no clear definition of the word in the canonical texts. In Pali sources, it con-
sistently appears as sakkāyadiṭṭhi. Its Sanskrit form is satkāyadṛṣṭi. Phoneti-
cally speaking, Pali sakkāya being Sanskritized as satkāya does not raise any 
problems. The Sanskrit form satkāyadṛṣṭi was translated into Chinese as 有身
見, literally, “view of existent body,” or simply 身見 “body view.” The com-
pound also appears phonetically transcribed as 薩迦耶見 (or rarely 薩伽耶見). 
The meaning of sat in this compound is, however, quite difficult to under-
stand. According to another hypothesis, sakkāya originally derived from 
sva-kāya “one’s own body.” Nakamura is one of the proponents of this 
theory. In his monumental dictionary,10 satkāya, as well as the Chinese 
translation based on it, is a wrong Sanskritization of sakkāya < sva-kāya. 
The main textual evidence that he adduces in favor of this derivation is the 
compound svakāyadṛṣṭi used by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
(XXIII 5).11
The compound sakkāyadiṭṭhi/satkāyadṛṣṭi was not, however, part of the 
original teaching of selflessness (anātman). It was probably a later addition to 
7  Ucchedavāda sato sattassa ucchedaṃ vināsam vibhavaṃ paññapenti (DN I, 32). Cf. MN I 
140; II, 228, 232; Vibhaṅga 378.
8  Sassatavāda, sassataṃ attanañca lokañca paññapenti (DN I, 13).
9  The Buddha’s attitude of answering only when asked ( pañhaṃ puṭṭho vyākaroti, DN I, 
175) and refusing to actively engage in debates with others is also linked to his views on 
language. Cf. T 99.02: 8b16-17; SN III. 138-139, etc.
10 Nakamura 2001: II, 946b.
11 On Oldenberg and others, see Imanishi 1986.
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the doctrinal system. Such early scriptures as the Suttanipāta actually contain 
only the word sakkāya, not the compound sakkāyadiṭṭhi. Here is a relevant 
quotation from the Suttanipāta that also sheds light on the original meaning 
of the term:
759.  Material phenomena, sounds, tastes, smells, tangibles and 
mental objects are desired, loved and agreeable as long as it 
is said, “They exist.” 
760.  The world, including the gods, thinks they are pleasing, but 
when they stop, they think this is suffering. 
761.  The Noble Ones regard the destruction of sakkāya as pleas-
ing. For the [Noble Ones] who see properly, this is contrary 
to [what is held by] the whole world.12
The material phenomena (rūpa), etc., are objects of desire and pleasure as long 
as they are assumed to exist. The Noble Ones, on the other hand, take delight 
in the destruction of sakkāya. In this context, sakkāya no doubt refers to the 
material phenomena, etc., as long as they are believed to exist ( yāvatatthīti 
vuccati). The verbal form atthi is replaced in the last stanza with its present 
participle sat, “existing.” The word kāya should then be taken not in its mean-
ing of “body” but rather as meaning “collection, group, totality,” a sense well 
attested in Buddhist literature.13 In the verses above, kāya means the entire 
group of material phenomena, sounds, smells, etc. It follows that sakkāya 
should be understood here as “group (or set) of phenomena [assumed to be] 
existent.” A similar verse can be found in the Saṃyuttanikāya (SN IV 127).
I think it is necessary here to refer to the context in the Upaniṣads where 
the philosophy of ātman is taught. Philosophers of the Upaniṣads seek after 
the truth of the universe. The universe or the whole world is expressed as 
idaṃ sarvam or sarvam. For instance,
oṃkāra eve ’daṃ sarvam. (Chāndogya Up. II, 22, 4)
aham eve ’daṃ sarvam asāni. (id. V, 1, 15)
sa ya eṣo ’ṇimā aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvam, tat satyaṃ, sa ātmā, 
12 Rūpā saddā rasā gandhā phassā dhammā ca kevalā |
Iṭṭhā kantā manāpā ca yāvatatthīti vuccati. || 759 || 
Sadevakassa lokassa ete vo sukhasammatā |
Yattha cete nirujjhanti taṃ nesaṃ dukkhasammataṃ. || 760 ||
Sukhanti diṭṭhamariyehi sakkāyassuparodhanaṃ | 
Paccanīkamidaṃ hoti, sabbalokena passataṃ. || 761 ||
13 See, for instance, compounds with °kāya 身 (in Chinese translation), such as 六觸身, 六受
身, 六想身, 六行身, 六識身, etc.
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tat tvam asi. (id. VI, 8, 7; 9, 4; 10, 3; 11, 3; 12, 3; 13, 3; 14, 3; 15, 
3; Cf. id 16, 3).
The phrase idaṃ sarvam is repeated several times in Chapter VI of the 
Chāndogya Upaniṣad, where Uddālaka’s philosophy is described. 
Also in the Buddhist texts we find passages such as:
What is sabbam?
Eye and form, ear and sound, nose and smell, tongue and taste, 
body and touch, and mind and dhammas. This is called sabbam.14
Here is expressed the thought that sabbam is the twelve āyatanas. We cannot 
doubt this context and the rhetorical device common between the Upaniṣads 
and Buddhist texts. If we admit this coincidence, the next instance will con-
firm our conviction. 
The dialogue between Upāsaka Visākha and Bhikkhunī Dhammadinnā 
begins with the question about sakkāya. 
They say sakkāya, sakkāya. What, says Bhagavat, is sakkāya?
Bhagavat says, the five upādānakkhandhas is sakkāya.15
If we add the sentence “What is sakkāya?” before the dialogue, then the 
context of this dialogue may be more easily grasped.
sabbaṃ sakkāyo.
katamo sakkāyo.
pañca ime, upādānakkhandhā sakkāyo.
This scripture does not define the meaning of the term sakkāya. The Fale 
biqiuni jing 法樂比丘尼經, a Chinese text corresponding to the Pali scrip-
ture, translates sakkāya as “own body”(自身), i.e., sva-kāya.16 But the 
pañcupādānakkhandhas cannot be the same as the body (kāya). The concept 
14 Sabbasutta, SN IV 15.
kiñca, bhikkhave, sabbaṃ.
cakkhuñceva rūpā ca, sotañca saddā ca, ghānañca gandhā ca, jivhā ca rasā ca, 
kāyo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca, mano ca dhammā ca.
idaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, sabbaṃ
雜阿含經 (T 99.02: 91a): 云何名一切. 佛告婆羅門. 一切者. 謂十二入處. 眼色. 耳聲. 鼻香. 舌
味. 身觸. 意法. 是名一切. 
15 Cūḷavedallasutta, MN I 298.
sakkāyo sakkāyo’ti, ayye, vuccati. Katamo nu kho, ayye, sakkāyo vutto bhagavatā’ ti
pañca kho ime, āvuso visākha, upādānakkhandhā sakkāyo vutto bhagavatā,
16 中阿含經 (T 26.01: 788a): 毗舍佉優婆夷便問曰. 賢聖. 自身説自身. 云何為自身耶. 法樂比丘
尼答曰. 世尊説五盛陰自身. 色盛陰. 覺. 想. 行. 識盛陰. 是謂世尊説五盛陰. 
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of body (kāya) is narrow. The objects of the four satipaṭṭhānas, for instance, 
are kāya, vedanā, citta and dhammas, and these are separated from each 
other; the body (kāya) cannot include citta and the others. For the same rea-
son, the pañcupādānakkhandhas cannot be the same as sakkāya. Therefore, 
it cannot be correct to translate sakkāya as “own body.” 
Theoretically speaking, it is unproblematic not to identify sakkāya with 
own body. Body is only a part of the pañcupādānakkhandhas. This is noticed 
in the Buddhist scriptures: 
Rāhula asked Bhagavat.
How to recognize, how to see, in order to annihilate the anusayas 
of “I”-consciousness, “mine”-consciouness and arrogance about all 
the characters of the body with consciousness and external world?17
The “body with consciousness,” i.e., “consciousness and body” (此識身) and 
the external world are the pañcupādānakkhandhas. Then the scripture con-
tinues to explain rūpa and other khandhas: 
rūpa: past, future and present; internal and external, etc.
Other khandhas are also explained in the same way. According to the scrip-
ture, the pañcupādānakkhandhas cover the whole world, internal and exter-
nal. Therefore, it is clear that the body alone cannot include both the internal 
and external world. 
The compound saviññāṇaka kāya (此識身) attracts our attention because 
it reminds us of sakkāya. This must be a trial to interpret sakkāya in a Bud-
dhist way, kāya being understood as body and sa- as saviññāṇa. Even if 
this is a Buddhist interpretation of sakkāya, this is not correct, but it is 
widely accepted in the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Za ahan jing 雜阿含經, 
Yogācārabhūmi (Yujiashidilun 瑜伽師地論, tr. Xuanzang 玄奘) and Benshi 
jing 本事經 (T 765.17, tr. Xuanzang). 
I would like to add another instance of the use of sakkāya from the 
Theragāthā: 
For innumerable kappas they obtained sakkāya.
This is their last (one), this is (their) last accumulation (= body). 
Now there is no transmigration of birth and death, no re-birth.18
17 Rāhulasutta, SN III, 135.
kathaṃ nu kho, bhante, jānato kathaṃ passato imasmiñca saviññāṇake kāye 
bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu ahaṅkāramamaṅkāramānānusayā na honti.
18 Theragāthā (202)
asaṅkheyyesu kappesu, sakkāyādhigatā ahū;
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It is clear that the theme of this verse is the last body of the disciples who 
attained bodhi or of the buddhas, both referred to in the previous verse. 
Samussayo in the second line means body, kāya or sarīra. Then what does 
sakkāya mean? The commentator explains as follows: 
sakkāya is the pañcupādānakkhandhas. 
They are called sakkāya, because they are the accumulation of 
dhammas 
existing in the highest sense.19
According to the commentary, sakkāya means the pañcupādānakkhandhas 
or paramatthato vijjamānadhammasamūha. It is quite clear that the com-
mentator understands sakkāya as sat-kāya and sat as paramatthato vijjamāna. 
Sakkāya is the compound of sat and kāya, and sat is the present participle of 
as-, meaning “existing in the highest sense,” paramatthato vijjamāna-, i.e., 
really existing. 
The pañcupādānakkhandhas really exist. This is the concept of the 
sakkāya. This concept is identical with the sakkāya in the Suttanipāta, where 
it is stated that the six kinds of objects exist. This difference is out of the 
question. Now it has become clear that the idea of the compound sakkāya is 
an antithesis of Uddālaka’s ontology. There is no reason to suspect that the 
Buddha criticized Uddālaka’s philosophy. 
Over the centuries, however, the original meaning of sakkāya most prob-
ably became obscure and eventually forgotten. The later attempts in scho-
lastic treatises and commentaries to elucidate the word actually distorted its 
original sense. It carried a simple and clear message: one should not regard 
material phenomena, etc., as existing and the Noble Ones must eradicate 
such a view. Such a statement also constitutes a devastating criticism of the 
concept of existence. 
In spite of the later misunderstanding of the original meaning of sakkāya, 
the basic stance of Buddhist philosophy has always been to criticize any view 
that takes existence as the fundamental principle. The *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra, 
for instance, declares that “all the sixty-two wrong views expounded in the 
Brahmajālasūtra have satkāya 有身見 as their root.”20 
tesamayaṃ pacchimako, carimoyaṃ samussayo;
jātimaraṇasaṃsāro, natthi dāni punabbhavo’
19 Theragāthā Aṭṭhakathā II, 69.
sakkāyāti pañcupādānakkhandhā. 
te hi paramatthato vijjamānadhammasamūhatāya’sakkāyā’ ti vuccanti.
20 又梵網經說六十二諸惡見趣. 皆有身見為本. (T 1545.27: 996b26-27)
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The doctrine of dependent arising ( paṭiccasamuppāda/pratītyasamutpāda) 
represents, of course, another biting criticism of the concept of “reality.” 
Leaving aside the controversial issue of whether the twelvefold chain of 
dependent arising is an early teaching or a later development, the doctrine 
represents the very essence of the Four Noble Truths. Sāriputta is said to 
have originally been Sañjaya’s disciple. (It is also said, however, that this 
is only a namesake.) According to the traditional accounts, Sāriputta heard 
a verse from Assaji, one of the Buddha’s first five disciples, and imme-
diately decided to convert to Buddhism. The verse was none other than 
the famous Dhammakāyagāthā or Pratītyasamutpādagāthā 縁起法頌 ( ye 
dhammā hetuppabhavā […]/ye dharmāḥ hetu- prabhavā […]). The episode 
can be said to encapsulate the symbolic moment of the Buddha’s making his 
appearance on the stage of Indian philosophy.
Concluding Remarks 
The basis of the Buddha’s uniqueness lies in the certainty given by his inner 
experience attainable through spiritual cultivation. This inner experience is 
not immediately comprehensible to anyone. One cannot understand it with-
out the empathy and discernment necessary to appreciate its significance. It 
is, therefore, said that only one who has the same experience as the Buddha, 
i.e., only another buddha, is able to really comprehend the Buddha. 
After his awakening, the Buddha hesitated whether to preach or not. He 
finally decided to do so after having been entreated by Brahma to benefit 
all sentient beings ignorant of the Truth. The Buddha’s teachings were a 
turning point in the history of Indian philosophy, and the Awakened One no 
doubt realized its full significance. 
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